1975, Château de Rambouillet, 50 kilometers south-west of Paris. The heads of state and government of the six leading industrial countries gather for their first joint summit meeting. Today’s Group of Seven (G-7) was born. At its 44th summit, which took place at La Malbaie, Canada last week, the group saw a historic transition from careful policy coordination to undisguised political discord. From tensions over a possible readmission of Russia to President Trump’s instruction not to endorse the arduously negotiated communiqué – the gathering ended in a diplomatic fiasco. The more so as only one day later, on 10th June, China successfully orchestrated the inking of a joint summit declaration among members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which also counts Russia and, more recently, India and Pakistan, among its members. Is the West breaking apart while the East consolidates?
On May 8, President Donald Trump decided to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal labeling it as “decaying and rotten”. Right from the early days of his campaign, Donald Trump has not shown much sympathy for this agreement, which the preceding Obama administration negotiated and crafted along with other states to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb. The recent high frequency visits of European officials (Macron, Merkel, Johnson) to the White House were the latest sign of the growing international nervousness and efforts to change the President’s mind. Indeed, the decision to pull out from the Iran nuclear deal deeply worries many policymakers and experts.
Populism and the liberal international order don’t mix well: The more populism there is, the less liberal the international order appears to become. Moreover, judging by the year-long presidency of Donald Trump, the liberal international order seems to be in particular danger if the most powerful state in the system catches the populist bug. Why is this so? Are populism and the liberal world order fundamentally incompatible? Can a populist be a leader of the free world?
Kurz vor Weihnachten schickte ich die korrigierten Druckfahnen für mein neues Buch zurück an den Verlag. Mein englischer Lektor witzelte darauf hin, dass wir das Buch unbedingt an Donald Trump schicken sollten, damit er es liest. Angesichts der gerade bekannt gewordenen täglichen Leseleistungen des amerikanischen Präsidenten errechnete ich sofort, dass er unter Berücksichtigung der Sommerpausen voraussichtlich kurz vor Weihnachten 2019 fertig sein müsste. Doch als ich kurz darauf die National Security Strategy der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (NSS) mit dem Vorwort des Präsidenten sah, hegte ich den Verdacht, dass er zumindest das erste Kapitel meines Buchs bereits gelesen hat.
Dieses erste Kapitel handelt über die normative Grundierung des globalen politischen Systems. Demnach kann dann von einem globalen politischen System gesprochen werden, wenn drei Bedingungen erfüllt sind. Continue reading “My Fury about Trump’s Fire”
Shortly before Christmas, I sent the corrected proofs for my new book back to my publisher. My English editor quipped that we should send the book to Donald Trump so he can read it. In view of the recently leaked daily reading performance of the President, I immediately calculated that, taking into account the summer breaks, he would probably finish it shortly before Christmas 2019. However, shortly after reading the December 2017 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS)” with the President’s preface, I suspected that he had already read at least the first chapter of my book.
This first chapter deals with the normative foundation of the global political system. Accordingly, one can speak of a global political system if three conditions are met: