‘Nationalism becomes predominantly a popular cause, […]. Internationalism, at the same stroke, starts to change camps – assuming new forms in the ranks of capital.’ This is how the historian Perry Anderson depicts the emergence of two groupings whose struggle shapes politics in our age: populist nationalism on one side against elitist internationalism on the other. The diagnosis – that a footloose capitalist elite dominates the international system, while popular reactions to globalisation find shelter in nationalism as the last line of defense – are shared by many academics and commentators of current affairs alike. The nationalist backlash is also the favoured concept to describe the recent resistance to European integration. When it comes to the studies on the politicization of the EU, the main dividing line runs between supranational European institutions on one side, and nationalist political entrepreneurs whipping up anti-EU sentiments on the other. This is not the full story however, as we argue in our new article Why Do some Labour Alliances Succeed in Politicizing Europe across Borders? in the Journal of Common Market Studies. The politicization of Europeanization is not necessarily a one-way street where pressures come from the transnational level and popular mobilizations are constrained by national silos.
It is not only the elderly and those with pre-existing illnesses who are among the potential victims of the Corona pandemic. The end of globalization itself, too, is seen as a possible long-term effect. Crises are indeed moments of historical recalibration. However, not everything changes after a crisis.
It is indeed questionable that the pandemic will lead to the end of globalization, at least economically. Undoubtedly, there are alternatives to the global production chains, and a partial renationalization of economic cycles is possible. That, though, comes at high costs and welfare losses. Upon the return of normalcy, public and private debt will have skyrocketed. This kind of environment does not make further globalization less likely.
The situation looks a bit different with regards to political globalization. Many view the current crisis as the hour of the executive, while others point to the fact that we are witnessing a renaissance of political regulation rather than the return of the sovereign nation-state.
Until an accurate assessment can be made, many things will happen. The outcome of the crisis will be determined not only by objective facts, but to a large extent also by battles over their interpretation.
In the past weeks, Tunisia elected a new parliament and a new president. Nine years after the so-called Arab Spring, the country has achieved considerable progress in terms of democratic institutions and processes. Yet, severe challenges call for the right balance between consensus and political dispute. A fragmented political landscape and public mistrust of elites are paralleled by grim economic prospects and high unemployment rates, which will demand serious reform efforts by newly elected president Kais Saied. Furthermore, structural issues like the lack of a constitutional court and the overdue dismantling of power structures established under former dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali still linger over the country. Mariam Salehi and Ilyas Saliba shed light on the problems faced by post-election Tunisia. Read the full article in German here.
The ancient Greeks and Plato had this idea of the philosopher kings. In their kingdom, the people enjoyed all freedoms and were governed by wise, benevolent rulers—and by them alone. In practice, this never happened because every supposedly benevolent ruler eventually came to a point where he saw his power under threat. If he is unwilling to share power, he cannot allow demonstrations, the founding of parties, or critical opinions. He needs to curtail the freedom of his citizens.
Today, autocratic tendencies are intensifying worldwide, with China under president Xi Jinping often being seen as a vanguard. The economic success of the People’s Republic has made autocracy a real option for some states. Even in the EU, where membership criteria prescribe a stable democracy, undemocratic values are experiencing a revival in states like Poland and Hungary, as well as in the thought of right-wing populist parties.
Paradoxically, in order to sustain their power, autocrats will resort to means usually associated with liberty and democracy. Take elections as an example. Virtually every autocratic state holds elections to uphold the pretense of participation, transforming people and opposition into accomplices. Whoever doesn’t play along becomes a target. A second example is internet access. In China, for instance, almost everything is being handled online. This renders life more convenient, but the state is eavesdropping, censoring, and intervening when it gets critical. Moreover, cooperation among autocracies has tightened. They join forces and help one another cope with sanctions.
The rise of autocracy has surprised many. After the fall of the Soviet Union, political scientist Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the “end of history”. He thought that sooner or later, every state on the globe will eventually democratize and people will live freely and in peace. Unfortunately, this turned out to be a premature assumption. It gives us a headache to think about the many people who still do not possess the right to speak and act freely. Our wish is to overcome the remaining autocracies one day. And to overcome them, we need to understand them.
Note: This text was originally published in the latest issue of Leibniz magazine. Read it in German here.