On May 8, President Donald Trump decided to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal labeling it as “decaying and rotten”. Right from the early days of his campaign, Donald Trump has not shown much sympathy for this agreement, which the preceding Obama administration negotiated and crafted along with other states to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb. The recent high frequency visits of European officials (Macron, Merkel, Johnson) to the White House were the latest sign of the growing international nervousness and efforts to change the President’s mind. Indeed, the decision to pull out from the Iran nuclear deal deeply worries many policymakers and experts.
On 21 March 2018, at the 10th extraordinary session of the African Union (AU) assembly in Kigali Rwanda, 44 member states adopted the initiative known as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The draft commits countries to removing tariffs on 90% of goods. When AfCFTA comes into force, supposing all 55 member states enforce it, it will create a single market for goods and services as well as a customs union, free movement of people, and subsequently a single currency.
In April 2018, practitioners of global governance had to respond to the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian city of Douma. In order to do so, however, it was necessary to acquire information on what happened there on April 7. Since establishing facts in a warzone is a notoriously difficult task, one may expect that neutral experts – such as those from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which aims at eliminating chemical weapons – would play an important role.
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The standoff over Catalan secession from Spain continues, with independence leaders in jail and in exile and the Spanish government administering direct rule over Catalonia. The unsettling situation has split not only Catalans and Spaniards, but Europe as a whole. Yet beyond the ongoing pyrotechnics, if we pull back to the ten thousand meter level, we can see that this issue raises a number of bigger questions: When is it appropriate for a region of a larger geopolitical entity to secede? What criteria should be used to decide the legitimacy of an independence bid? These questions are relevant not only for the Catalan situation, but for other regions of Europe where secessionist tensions flare up on a regular basis.
Are we witnessing the end of the Liberal Order as we know it? Two important new books on this pressing question were presented and discussed at a recent WZB event. You can watch the full video recording below.
Populist parties challenge democracy, European integration, and international order. At the same time, authoritarian states openly challenge liberal values. Counter-revolutions and counter-institutionalizations abound. Many people wonder how the liberal world could get into such a crisis. Is Europe disintegrating? How can the resistance to the global governance be explained? Is there a way to overcome the multiple crises?
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A specter is haunting the liberal political order—the specter of authoritarian populism. Antiliberal and antipluralist, authoritarian populist ideology questions individual and, especially, minority rights. It questions the rights of “others” to limit the “rights” of the majority culture. Part of this antiliberalism is founded on unconditional support for national sovereignty and the rejection of any political authority beyond national borders, in spite of externalities and interdependencies. Authoritarian populism is also “antipluralist” in the sense that it usually contains a deproceduralized and thus homogeneous notion of the majority. These sentiments are often linked to the “silent majority,” those who—according to Richard Nixon—do not express their opinions, but represent the will of the people. Authoritarian populism asserts that this collective will is known without public debate or other procedures to generate it. Authoritarian populists pit this supposed homogeneous will of the people against immoral, corrupt, and parasitic elites.
Exactly one year has passed since Prime Minister Theresa May triggered Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union (EU). Accordingly, London and Brussels have only one more year to agree and ratify the details of the United Kingdom’s (UK) orderly withdrawal from the bloc and the principles of their future relationship. Otherwise they will divorce without any deal unless both sides agree to extend the two year period intended by Article 50.
Since the European Council (EC) opened the final and decisive phase of Brexit negotiations on 22–23 March 2018, time seems just perfect to reflect on what has been negotiated so far and what we can expect from future talks.
In her contribution, Friederike Luise Kelle builds on findings from conflict research to understand why the behavior of the conflict parties in the current dispute in Catalonia is much more rational than they are usually perceived. Friederike shows that the Spanish central government’s decision to escalate the democratic process judicially and through the use of force, the references to the legitimacy of their action in the face of widespread systemic corruption, and their rejection of EU mediation are perfectly rational strategies. The same holds for Catalan leaders: The narrative of repression in a democratic country in the heart of the EU, fractionalization, and the lack of support for the election of Jordi Turull by the Popular Unity Candidacy (Candidaturad’Unitat Popular, CUP) are representative of common patterns in (self-determination) conflicts. Underlining the risk of the conflict becoming effectively indivisible, Friederike recommends that both sides engage in argumentative, legal, and tactical de-escalation, embrace the concept of actual concessions, and navigate towards a federal solution. In summary, she asserts that the conflict literature is well-equipped to make sense of the sometimes seemingly irrational behavior in this conflict.
You find the whole blog post in German here.
Four weeks ago, Jean Claude Juncker appointed Martin Selmayr as the European Commission’s future administrative head – the so-called Secretary-General. This move came as a surprise, entered the respective Commission meeting agenda only last minute, and sidestepped the usual procedure for internal promotions. This staffing choice made it to various national news outlets (Le Monde, Zeit Online, and The Irish Times, to name a few), significantly increased online searches, created a veritable Twitter storm, and ultimately culminated into a rather confrontational debate in the European Parliament. For a public servant job in Brussels’ Berlaymont building, this is an unusual amount of public spotlight. Why so much fuss about one supranational official?
Addressing the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos in January 2018, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi followed in the Chinese President Xi Jingping’s footsteps from last year’s event to present a clarion call in defence of globalisation, stating that ‘India is an investment in future’.
A few days after the Davos summit, India welcomed the heads of state from ten member nations of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for its 69th Republic Day celebrations in what marked a break from the usual diplomatic practice of inviting a singular head of state. Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India, highlighted the essence of ‘shared values, common destiny’ in the India–ASEAN partnership. Despite this historic occasion, a series of developments within its immediate borders have raised question marks on the coherence of India’s engagement to its neighbouring states. Before seeking to understand what these present day challenges are, one first needs to place a historical context on how India moved towards greater regional multilateralism.