Note: This article was first published on The Loop
RCEP is only the latest of many new multilateral institutions created by China. The alternative to American-led liberal international order looks increasingly viable.
Last week’s signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) brings China’s continued embrace of multilateralism into stark relief. While the United States under President Trump has recoiled from multilateral institutions and jettisoned its much-touted Trans-Pacific Partnership, China and fourteen other Asia-Pacific countries have just created the largest preferential trading zone in history, encompassing 30 percent of the world’s population and around a third of global GDP. While the RCEP is a relatively shallow trade agreement and is less “comprehensive” than it sounds, it is a major symbolic victory in China’s attempt to reorient world order.
But as I discuss in a recent publication, the RCEP is only the latest milestone in China’s longstanding efforts to build a range of new multilateral agreements and institutions alongside existing ones.
From Joining to Building
For a long time, China was focused on joining established multilateral institutions. China observed. China learned. Many thought that by engaging with existing institutions, China would be “socialized” into the established way of doing things.
But under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China’s foreign policy has thrown the old maxim of “biding and hiding” overboard. In its place, the Chinese state has been instructed to push for a leadership role in global affairs, and to “take an active part in leading the reform of the global governance system”.
In fact, China’s efforts to create a new multilateral architecture is much more advanced than many people assume. Over the last two decades China has been involved in the creation of a series of new multilateral institutional initiatives in its region and beyond. These cover the full gamut of issues of international order, from traditional issues of trade, finance and security to newer issues such as internet governance and human rights.
This strongly suggests that China is no longer content to “join” the existing global order but is constructing its own multilateral infrastructure. For some observers, such initiatives suggest that “China’s foreign policy is working systematically towards a realignment of the international order.” The Table below suggest this may be the case.
China’s Multilateral Institutional Initiatives, 1990-2017
|Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO)
|Asia-Pacific Legal Metrology Forum (APLMF)
|Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
|International Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR)
|ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
|Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA)
|Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
|Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD)
|China-Arab States Cooperation Forum
|China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum (CCETCF)
|Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (17+1, formerly 16+1)
|World Internet Conference
|Forum of China and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC Forum)
|Lancang Mekong Cooperation Framework
|New Development Bank (NDB)
|Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB)
|ASEAN + 3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO)
|Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation
|South-South Human Rights Forum
[Source: Stephen 2020]
A Competing World Order?
While most observers see China’s new multilateral institutions as an important development in Chinese foreign policy with significant implications for international order, there is little agreement on what these implications are. Does China’s interest in multilateralism and willingness to construct new institutions indicate support for a rules-based, institutionalized international order, or is it a sign of dissatisfaction with the institutional status quo and a revisionist agenda for global governance?
The answer is “it depends”. Some of China’s new institutions are likely to complement existing multilateral institutions, while others will substitute or compete with them.
Although it is tempting to think of China’s new institutions as engaged in an institutional rivalry with existing ones, this need not be the case. For example, institutions like the Asia-Pacific Legal Metrology Forum and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia were largely created to fill institutional vacuums. Others, such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, have a greater potential to become alternatives and rivals to established institutions such as the Asian Development Bank.
Some of China’s new institutions may also promote values that are at odds to those of established institutions, but not necessarily all. Formats such as the World Internet Conference and the South-South Human Rights Forum appear primarily designed to promote China’s preferred norms of “internet sovereignty” and prioritizing the “right to development” over individual rights. But others, such as the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization or the newly-created RCEP, appear largely to reproduce existing norms.
It is important not to jump to premature conclusions about China’s new multilateral initiatives or simply assume that they are designed to compete with and erode existing institutions. At the same time, it would be naïve to assume that they are simply new additions to an increasingly crowded landscape of international forums and institutions.
Depending on how China’s foreign policy evolves, they could become important mechanisms by which China can influence the norms and rules of global governance.
Looking ahead, China’s new multilateral institutions are likely to play an increasingly prominent role as global rivalries between the United States and China intensify. The American-led, liberal international order is not the only game in town.