In her contribution, Friederike Luise Kelle builds on findings from conflict research to understand why the behavior of the conflict parties in the current dispute in Catalonia is much more rational than they are usually perceived. Friederike shows that the Spanish central government’s decision to escalate the democratic process judicially and through the use of force, the references to the legitimacy of their action in the face of widespread systemic corruption, and their rejection of EU mediation are perfectly rational strategies. The same holds for Catalan leaders: The narrative of repression in a democratic country in the heart of the EU, fractionalization, and the lack of support for the election of Jordi Turull by the Popular Unity Candidacy (Candidaturad’Unitat Popular, CUP) are representative of common patterns in (self-determination) conflicts. Underlining the risk of the conflict becoming effectively indivisible, Friederike recommends that both sides engage in argumentative, legal, and tactical de-escalation, embrace the concept of actual concessions, and navigate towards a federal solution. In summary, she asserts that the conflict literature is well-equipped to make sense of the sometimes seemingly irrational behavior in this conflict.
You find the whole blog post in German here.